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Abstract 
 
The paper proposes several facts in support of the evidence that French banks 
actively manage their leverage. Impulse responses estimated from multivariate 
models allow assessing which balance sheet claims are used by banks to fine-tune 
their leverage. It is found that leverage adjustments are primarily attained through 
changes in domestic and foreign credit. The dynamic pattern of leverage is less 
affected by shocks to securities holdings, implying that the amplifying mechanism 
on the real economy that occurs via leverage adjustment is expected to work 
directly via bank credit rather than via asset markets. 
 
JEL classification numbers: E02, E32, G21. 
Keywords: Banks, financial-real sector linkages, leverage management, shock 
transmissions. 
 
 
1  Introduction  
According to monetary policy theory, banks directly transmit unexpected policy 
shocks exclusively through the bank lending channel of the credit view. Pioneered 
by [1], this channel describes the amplifying effect that banks have on the real 
economy through changes in credit supply, resulting from variations in liquidity 
provided by the central bank
2
. Studies on the bank lending channel have, however, 
showed that its empirical relevance is rather weak. In particular, this channel tends 
                                                 
1
 University of East London. School of Business and Law. Water Lane, London E15 4LZ. 
E-mail: c.davino@uel.ac.uk 
2
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to fail whenever a bank is large and/or liquid ([2]), has high capital ([3]), operates 
in a highly concentrated market ([4]), engages in securitisation ([5]) or has 
important foreign branches ([6]). Moreover, the burgeoning of non-banks financial 
institutions observed in the last two decades represents a further obstacle to the 
functioning of this channel. Indeed, even if bank loans can be successfully altered 
by the monetary policy shock, economic agents’ spending might be financed by 
other unregulated non-bank lenders, offsetting the desired effect of the central 
bank on economic activity.   
Nevertheless, the latest financial crisis has highlighted the strength of the 
inter-linkages between the banking sector and the real economy, leading many 
researchers to investigate the existence of alternative transmission channels in 
which banks have a prominent role ([7]). Most of the attention has been devoted to 
the amplification mechanisms set off by the feedbacks between banks balance 
sheets and asset markets (a good survey is provided by [8]). A major contribution 
has been provided by [2] who have advanced the hypothesis that banks can 
amplify business cycle fluctuations via active leverage management. As the value 
of assets changes with cyclical conditions, and so does leverage, banks might, 
indeed, decide to actively act either to restore a desired fixed leverage threshold or 
to allow the leverage follow the cycle
3
. Indeed, book leverage, measured as total 
assets over net worth, if left unmanaged, is countercyclical: it falls during booms 
and increases during slumps. This is because the value of banks’ assets tends to be 
pro-cyclical
4
 and the net worth grows at a faster rate than total assets, assuming 
that the value of liabilities stays roughly constant. However, if leverage is actively 
managed, banks will increase (decrease) the leverage ratio during booms (slumps) 
amplifying business cycle fluctuations. 
Based on this very recent literature, this paper aims to test empirically whether 
cyclical variations in balance sheet size result in active leverage adjustment by 
banks for the French case. How leverage management takes place is also of central 
interest in this research. The expansion (reduction) of balance sheet size, which 
happens if banks decide to increase (decrease) their leverage during an economic 
boom (slump), can, indeed, be carried out in several ways. Banks might, for 
instance, increase (reduce) loans issuance having a direct effect on the real 
economy. Or, instead, they can decide to invest (fire-sale) in asset markets, putting 
pricing pressure on selected securities. In this case, the propagation effects caused 
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4
 In particular, [9] argue that the pro-cyclicality of assets is mainly due to the fact that a 
large portion of security claims are marked-to-market. The literature, however, proposes 
several other motives other than accounting standards for which banks balance sheets are 
pro-cyclical, most notably: Basel capital regulations and change in risk perception (see 
[11], for a survey). 
Pro-Cyclical Banking Leverage in France 3  
by banks’ behaviour on the real economy are more complex and difficult to 
quantify as the transmission will work via asset prices and the net worth of the 
players in asset markets.  
This paper is the first attempt to focus exclusively on the pro-cyclicality of the 
French banking system. Available empirical evidence is primarily based on results 
obtained for a large panel of banks belonging to several European countries ([12]) 
or focusing on the Canadian ([13]) and German ([14]) banking systems.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the underpinnings of the 
liquidity channel and of the new financial accelerator. Section 3 provides some 
preliminary statistics on the balance sheet variables of French banks and in 
Section 4 multivariate models are formally estimated alongside relevant impulse 
response functions. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
2  The New Financial Accelerator 
 
The subprime financial crisis brought about a profound reconsideration on how 
the banking sector can transmit shocks to the real economy. The classical bank 
lending channel has, indeed, proved to be badly supported by empirical models 
mainly because the banking sector is little affected by monetary policy shocks, 
which are, hence, merely transmitted by banks to the real economy. Researchers 
have then focused their attention to other shocks (i.e. other than monetary policy 
ones) which might have a substantial impact on business cycle via the banking 
sector.  Most notably, a large consensus has been reached about the fact the roots 
of the observed amplifications of economic cycle via the banking sector are to be 
found in assets and funding markets dynamics.  
In [8] the liquidity channel is defined as the mechanism that transmits shocks from 
the banking system to the real economy which is set off by self-reinforcing mutual 
feedbacks between assets markets and banks’ balance sheets. As detailed formally 
in [15], the liquidity channel works in the following way: let’s assume that a 
drainage of liquidity in banks’ funding markets occurs and that this leads banks to 
fire sale their claims in order to meet their debt obligations. The consequential 
downward pressures in asset prices results in balance sheet corrosion for all those 
agents that hold the same assets who will, in turn, sell more assets depressing 
prices even further. When the liquidity channel is set off by this pro-cyclical and 
self-reinforcing interaction between market and funding liquidity, i.e. the liquidity 
spiral, banks will be compelled to cut their lending to the economy. The 
mechanism also works in the reverse: during an economic boom, banks can 
expand their balance sheet at ease given the high liquidity in funding markets (and 
lower costs of borrowing), causing pricing inflation in some asset markets. 
Stronger balance sheets of economic agents will, in turn, put further inflationary 
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pressure on asset prices and so on.  
Along the lines of [15], [9] have stressed that an initial shock to asset values (due 
to the liquidity spiral, the standard asset price channel
5
 or any other exogenous 
factor) can be amplified even more by the banking system, depending on whether 
banks actively adjust their leverage either pro-cyclically or to target a fixed level. 
This amplification mechanism set off by leverage adjustments has been referred to 
as the new financial accelerator by [10], as it is similar to the financial accelerator 
([16]) but operates through banks’ net worth rather than through that of borrowers.  
[9] argue that the increase (decrease) in asset prices and in balance sheet size 
typically observed during an economic boom (recession) causes book leverage to 
fall
6
 (increase), if left unmanaged. This is particularly true for those agents, such 
as financial intermediaries, that have an important share of asset claims in their 
balance sheet that are valued at fair value. However, banks might actively adjust 
their leverage by further expanding (reducing) their balance sheet which, in turn, 
will magnify the effects of the cycle on the real economy and asset markets. In 
particular, if banks adjust their leverage by expanding their size through an 
increase in credit, then, shock are directly transmitted by banks to the real 
economy; if instead, banks expand their size via an increase in their securities 
holdings, then, the shock propagation to the real economy works through assets 
prices and markets’ liquidity.  
Next section aims at providing some statistical evidence on whether French banks 
actively adjust their leverage, providing some scope for the existence of the new 
financial accelerator. The choice to focus on the French banking system is dictated 
by a number of reasons. Firstly, the French banking system is highly concentrated 
with the largest banks featuring a universal business model, implying that balance 
sheets are more sensitive to changes in asset prices given the inclusion of 
investment banking business units in the consolidated accounts. Secondly, French 
banks are characterised by a higher reliance, compared to EMU average, on 
non-deposit funding (Figure 1), implying that the feedbacks between the banking 
system and asset markets could be relatively more important.  
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Figure 1: Selected balance sheet ratios: France and the euro area 
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Source: ECB. Figure 1 shows a snapshot of the three series in January 2008. Data refer to Monetary Financial Institutions 
(MFIs) balance sheets. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total assets to capital (book leverage). 
 
 
 
 
3  Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Some preliminary evidence on the French case  
 
Figure 2 shows that French banks’ assets have followed an overall pro-cyclical 
pattern, despite the high volatility observed for the de-trended series in real terms. 
Also, the cyclical behaviour of banking assets is characterised by a very close 
co-movement with the level of leverage; this is particularly evident since the early 
2000s. The co-movement between leverage and assets cycles suggests that banks 
actively manage their leverage in a pro-cyclical manner. Indeed, if banks did not 
adjust their leverage, the observed relationship between leverage and business 
cycle would be negative.  
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Figure 2: Cyclical fluctuations in real GDP and assets versus leverage 
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Note: The cyclical component of the series is extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Real assets and GDP 
(left-hand scale) are in logs, leverage (right-hand scale) in levels. Assets are deflated by the CPI (INSEE). 
 
 
This result is further confirmed by the striking positive relation between the 
annual growth rate of leverage and real assets (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Annual growth rates of assets and banking sector leverage 
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Note: Annual growth rates are computed for quarterly data over the period 1998-2012. 
 
Granger causality tests (Table 1) also confirm the evidence of mutual feedbacks 
between leverage and total assets. Moreover, they reveal that mutual feedbacks 
between leverage and foreign loans, both with counterparties in the euro area and 
in the rest of the world. 
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Table 1: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
 Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob. 
Total Assets does not Granger Cause Leverage 0,854 0,493
Leverage does not Granger Cause Total Assets 1,431 0,226
Total domestic credit does not Granger Cause Leverage 1,875 0,117
Leverage does not Granger Cause Total domestic credit 2,943 0,022
Loans to Euro Area does not Granger Cause Leverage 1,735 0,145
Leverage does not Granger Cause Loans to Euro Area 0,816 0,516
Loans to the rest of the world does not Granger Cause Leverage 1,766 0,138
Leverage does not Granger Cause Loans to the rest of the world 0,947 0,438
Interbank securities, Short-term does not Granger Cause Leverage 0,640 0,635
Leverage does not Granger Cause Interbank securities, Short-term 2,902 0,023
Interbank securities, Long-term does not Granger Cause Leverage 0,036 0,997
Leverage does not Granger Cause Interbank securities, Long-term 2,018 0,094
Mutual funds shares does not Granger Cause Leverage 3,126 0,016
Leverage does not Granger Cause Mutual funds shares 1,245 0,294
Securities issued by the private sector does not Granger Cause Leverage 2,591 0,038
Leverage does not Granger Cause Securities issued by the private sector 1,801 0,131  
Notes: Four lags used for the Granger causality test. 
 
Cross-correlation analysis is a useful preliminary tool for understanding whether 
leverage adjustments by banks occur by fine-tuning the balance sheet size either in 
an orderly manner, (i.e. by fine-tuning a particular asset-side item) or in an 
unsystematic manner (i.e. by adjusting the whole composition of banks’ assets). 
Table 2 reports the cross-correlations of the cyclical component of leverage with 
that of several balance sheet asset-side variables.  
 
Table 2: Cross-correlations between the leverage cycle and the cyclical component 
of assets 
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The cyclical component of total assets shows the highest correlation coefficient 
which reaches its peak at time t, implying the contemporaneous (i.e. intra-quarter) 
co-movement of the two cycles. The cross-correlation of the leverage cycle with 
other asset-side items, such as loans and securities are relatively lower, never 
reaching a coefficient higher than ±0.4. In all cases the cross-correlations with the 
majority of other claims also reach their peak at time t; this is probably due to the 
low frequency of the data. This evidence also indicates a very dynamic system in 
which balance sheet claims respond promptly to leverage changes. 
 
3.2 Empirical impulse-response analysis from a multivariate 
model 
Active leverage management is attained by banks through variations in both assets 
and liabilities. In particular, the process works in the following way. Let’s imagine 
that the value of some asset (A) increases, strengthening the balance sheet of banks 
having those assets among their claims. If the value of liabilities (L) stays roughly 
constant, then, book leverage (lev) will fall. Leverage is, indeed, equal to the 
following ratio: 
                     (1) 
 
If banks do not react to the change in asset prices, then, there is a negative 
relationship between the value of assets and leverage. If, instead, banks decide to 
restore a given leverage target ratio or to increase leverage in a pro-cyclical 
manner, then they will take on additional liabilities which allow the purchase of 
more assets.  
In order to understand the extent of shocks transmissions to the real economy via 
the banking system it is important to gauge which type of claims allow banks to 
fine-tune their leverage. If banks, for instance, choose to purchase selected 
securities that have markets which are not perfectly liquid, then, assets prices 
increase even further and leverage falls, as described above. Then, banks in order 
to restore their leverage will purchase even more assets, putting further pressure 
on asset prices. In this case, banks will transmit shocks to the real economy in a 
rather indirect way as the transmission mechanism will work mainly through 
changes in the net worth of financial counterparties caused by the increased 
demand for the asset.  
If banks, instead, choose to issue more credit to the private sector, then, the 
transmission to the real economy will be immediate and will resemble to the bank 
lending channel and the inter-linkages between asset markets and banks’ balance 
sheets will be weaker.  
Lastly, banks might have no predefined strategy to adjust the size of their balance 
sheet; in this case, an upward adjustment in assets will be achieved by increasing 
credit supply and assets holdings to different degrees.  
In order to establish how leverage is managed, selected impulse response 
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functions are estimated from a Vector Auto Regressive model (VAR, [18]) for the 
French data. Given the large number of asset-side items which can be used by the 
banking system to adjust the leverage, several VARs are estimated. In particular, 
each VAR contains a set of fixed variables, that is, book-leverage, total banking 
assets and real GDP, to which is added one (or more) asset-side banking claim 
which varies with each model. The rationale behind the choice of the fixed 
variables are found in the model described in [9], as explained in the Section 2. 
Among the several banking claims considered, are found: domestic credit and to 
the banking sector, foreign loans (both to the euro area and the rest of the world), 
inter-bank securities (both short and long term) and other claims (such as 
securities issued by the private sector, mutual funds and other shares). Summary 
statistics on all the endogenous variables considered are found in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Summary statistics 
 
Source: Banque de France. Balance sheet variables are expressed in millions, Real GDP in billions. 
 
The endogenous variables included in multivariate models are in log-levels in 
order to allow for implicit cointegration relations between the series. Impulse 
responses are generated based on each of the VAR
i
(pi) model of the following 
form: 
 
                       (2) 
Where  is a vector of endogenous variables,  is a constant term and  is a 
vector of white noise disturbances. The vector  includes the following 
variables: 
    (3) 
Table 4 reports the specifications and model adequacy tests for each VAR
i
(pi) 
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model
7
.  
Table 4: VAR
i
(pi) models specifications 
 
The six models have unit roots smaller than one and disturbances behave fairly 
well. The LM test for serial correlation indicates no autocorrelation at 5% 
confidence level in all models; however, the White test reveals some 
heteroskedasticity in a limited number of models.    
Models in (1) are used to estimate generalised impulse response functions 
(Pesaran and Shin, 1996), which allow estimating the dynamic pattern of a 
variable xt to a shock to another system’s variable through orthogonal innovations 
which are invariant to variable ordering. 
In order to understand how the balance sheet is adjusted to fine-tune the leverage 
pro-cyclically, it is of primary importance to analyse the dynamic pattern of 
leverage following shocks in different asset-side variables. However, beforehand, 
a check test of (1) is necessary to confirm that the model estimated adequately 
supports the variables’ dynamics as described in Section 2 and the stylised facts 
advanced in Section 3. Figures 4.a and 4.b report the estimated responses of the 
systems’ variables when assets and leverage are shocked.   
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Figure 4.a: Generalised impulse response functions with respect to a one-standard 
deviation shock to Total Assets 
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Figure 4.b: Generalised impulse response functions with respect to a one-standard 
deviation shock to Leverage 
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Note: Figures 4.a and 4.b show the accumulated responses of the variables in the system following a one-standard deviation 
positive shock to the structural error of the total assets and leverage equations respectively. The endogenous variables 
included in the VAR(4) in logs are: leverage, total assets, total domestic credit and real GDP. Monthly data covers the 
period 1997-2012. Details of the estimated VAR(4) model are reported in Table 4, specification 1. 
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The impulse response functions shown refer to the specification of model (1) in 
which  is total domestic credit; nevertheless, impulse responses are 
broadly robust among models. Figure 4a shows the cumulated generalised impulse 
responses to a one standard deviation shock in total assets, equal to about 1.6% 
increase on impact. The shock causes a contemporaneous and significant increase 
in leverage of about 1.5%. The effect on leverage increases over the 24-months 
horizon, following closely the dynamic path of the exogenous shock in total assets, 
increasing by as much as 20%. This evidence supports the fact French banks 
actively adjust their leverage as an unexpected shock to asset value has a positive 
and significant effect on leverage. 
Figure 4.b shows the cumulated generalised impulse responses to an exogenous 
shock to leverage. The estimates show a positive and significant effect of total 
assets which, in cumulated terms, reaches over 25% after 2 years.  
The insignificant effect on real GDP in both cases is surely due to the fact that 
shocks to banking assets and leverage have an indirect effect on the real economy 
via selected banking claims, the net worth of borrowers and/or asset markets. 
Overall, the evidence showed in Figures 4.a and 4.b confirms the existence of 
mutual feedbacks between banking leverage and total assets as suggested by the 
preliminary analysis in the previous section.  
Figure 5 reports the generalised impulse responses of leverage when shocking the 
asset-side item(s) in each of the seven VAR
i
(pi) models (see Table 4 
for specification). As previously mentioned, this approach allows understanding 
which type of claim banks typically use to adjust their leverage.  
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Figure 5: Generalised impulse response functions of leverage in various models 
with respect to a one-standard deviation shocks to selected claims 
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Figure 5 (continued): Generalised impulse response functions of leverage in 
various models with respect to a one-standard deviation shocks to selected claims 
 
 
Model 1 includes as asset claim all domestic credit. As it can be noticed in the top 
graph of Figure 5, a one-standard deviation shock to domestic credit (to all sectors) 
has a positive and significant effect to leverage which increases by about 6% after 
one year. When the two sub-categories of total domestic credit are considered 
separately into credit to the private sector and to the banking sector (Model 2) it 
can be noticed that credit to the private sector has a relatively larger effect on 
leverage than the latter. Altogether, these pieces of evidence suggest that a shock 
to credit to the private sector has a relatively large effect on leverage. When 
considering foreign loans, split into loans to the euro area and to the rest of the 
world (Model 3), it can be noticed that also these variables have a relatively large 
positive effect on leverage. In particular, a positive shock to loans to the rest of the 
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world causes leverage to increase by 20% after 2 years. On the other hand, the 
response of leverage to shocks in interbank claims, both short and long term 
maturities, is rather small and significant only within the first six months of the 
horizon (model 4). Shocks to securities issued by the private sector (model 5) and 
mutual funds shares (model 6) see no significant response on leverage. Therefore, 
the evidence proposed in Figure 5 shows that the increase in leverage occurs 
mainly through the increase in credit, both domestic and foreign. This implies that 
the transmission channel activated by banks’ leverage adjustments barely works 
thorough asset markets and thus, should not put considerable pressures on asset 
prices. The effect on asset prices might only be indirect through borrowers’ 
investment decisions and the self-reinforcing spiral between asset size and 
leverage spiral should not be relevant.   
 
 
 
4  Conclusion 
 
 
Understanding whether the banking system in a country actively adjusts its 
leverage with the business cycle is of crucial importance to gauge the strength of 
the linkages between the financial and the real sectors. This is mostly true for 
those countries in which a liquidity channel is potentially important as banks, the 
real sectors and assets markets can be particularly interrelated.   
This paper provides evidence on pro-cyclical leverage management practices by 
the French banking system. The results point to a limited role of banks to amplify 
business cycle fluctuations via assets markets and to self-reinforcing feedbacks 
between the leverage and the credit cycles. Pro-cyclical leverage adjustments 
occur mainly through traditional loans, suggesting that business cycle fluctuations 
are directly amplified via claims to the private sector. Furthermore, leverage is 
also actively adjusted through foreign claims, suggesting the set-off of an 
international propagation channel via cross-border bank lending.  
The mutual feedbacks that exist between balance sheet size and leverage for the 
French case, therefore, are not entirely explained by the mechanism by [9] in 
which banks, when adjusting actively their leverage put significant pricing 
pressure on assets markets, setting off mutual feedbacks between bank leverage 
and asset markets.  
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